Notes on Heidegger's Being and Time - 1.V: Being-in as such (pp. 169-224, §§ 28-38) - Wednesday, 25 November 2015

1.V: Being-in as such (pp. 169-224, §§ 28-38)

Wednesday, 25 November 2015 (Notes by Marton Ribary)

Structure of Heidegger’s discussion of “Being-in”

Heidegger discusses the “Being-in” of Dasein in two major sections. One considers the existential constitution of the “Da-“ of Dasein, the other the everydayness of Dasein. “Da-“ is explicated according to disposition (Befindlichkeit, translated by Macquarrie-Robinson with the unfortunate expression “state-of-mind”) and understanding (Verstehen), and the relation of these two constitutive characteristics in interpretation, assertion and discourse (Rede, possibly equivalent with parole). Heidegger discusses the everydayness of Dasein via idle talk (Gerede, which bridges the two sections), curiosity (Neugier) and ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit). These three aspects are reminiscent of sophism as ridiculed by Socrates in the dialogues of Plato. Heidegger’s description of everydayness may have Platonic origins. The three aspects of Gerede, Neugier and Zweideutigkeit are brought together in one complex phenomenon which Heidegger describes as Dasein’s fallen character (Verfallen), a tendency which cannot be avoided. Heidegger insists that neither Verfallen, nor its constitutive aspects are meant to be negative or in any way derogatory about Dasein – it is just a fact, nothing more.

Disposition (Befindlichkeit)

Disposition is the way how I find myself in the world. My mood (Stimmung) is a surface manifestation among other possible manifestations of that disposition. Disposition expresses Dasein’s openness to the world and makes Dasein capable to see the world being disclosed. To put it in simple terms, disposition resembles some kind of unarticulated knowledge. Before the knowledge about the world is articulated, it has been always already known through Dasein’s disposition.

Fear (Furcht)

Heidegger demonstrates his understanding of disposition on the example of a negative manifestation, namely fear (Furcht). His selection of a negative examples in SZ is conspicuous, and it may be motivated by the via negativa approach of Medieval scholasticism which insisted that God’s true nature is beyond human understanding and can be approximated only negatively by saying what God is not. For Heidegger, Dasein seems to be a similarly puzzling phenomenon which resists to be described in positive terms. Heidegger uses the example of fear in other parts of SZ when he discusses anxiety (Angst, fear without an object) and Being-towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode, anxiety about one’s finiteness) later on. Heidegger investigates the phenomenon of fear systematically in three parts. If the phenomenon of fear is symbolically described as A↔B, then the three parts are “the very entity which is afraid” (A), “that in the face of which we fear” (B), and “fearing as such” (↔) (140-141).

In/authenticity

Inauthenticity is equated with the complex phenomenon which is Dasein’s factical fallen character (Verfallen) as Heiddeger passingly writes: “falling, what we have called the ‘inauthenticity’ of Dasein” (175). The authenticity/inauthenticity divide is about Dasein’s potential character to be its Self or not be its Self. The latter option, that is, Being not its Self is the same as falling into the world. This is not an ethical choice for Dasein as Heidegger notes that Dasein is “already always” fallen. That Dasein has a fallen character is a fact, it is a starting point, not the result of an ethical choice. “Dasein has always already (zunächst immer schon) fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’”. (175) The everydayness of Daesin’s fallen character separates Dasein from its potential to be its Self. Everydayness pushes Dasein into the “they” where Dasein follows a set path and exercises a routine. Dasein then exists not as its Self, but as one of the “they”. (The idea of “they” is also reminiscent of the Socratic critique of sophism which is described to be the wisdom pleasing the “masses”, the polloi.)

Notes on Heidegger's Being and Time - 1.IV: The “They” (pp. 149-168, §§ 25-27) - Wednesday, 11 November 2015

1.IV: The “They” (pp. 149-168, §§ 25-27)

Wednesday, 11 November 2015 (Notes by Caroline Kaye)

The question of ‘in’

“Thus Dasein’s world frees entities which not only are quite distinct from equipment and Things, but which also – in accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein themselves – are ‘in’ the world in which they are at the same time encountered within-the-world, and are ‘in’ it by way of Being-in –the-world.” (118-9)

There is a tendency to regard the ‘in’ here as appertaining to ‘inside’ as in a container. This is not what Heidegger is driving at. One is not ‘in’ the world as if the world were a type of jam jar into which we are placed. We should think more about the kind of ‘in’ when used to describe (say) being ‘in’ love, or being ‘in’ doubt. (Not a car in a garage) World, and being in the world, or ‘in’ world should be seen as dynamic. Not static. Not objective. Lived existence, as activity, not necessarily in the physical sense. Not ‘in’ as ‘inside’ in a literal, physical sense.

‘Stitched into’ the world

We also discussed the sense of being ‘stitched into’ the world, or our existence. ‘Knowing’ things is not in any way ‘starting from scratch.’ We recognise the contextualised nature of knowledge. Life is something that is already happening when we enter it. It’s not something we can ‘stop’ and step outside from. There is no ‘pause’ button to press that would allow us to take an objective look at the world, or aspects of it. We are never outside World.

Conventions in the world precede our own existence. This pre-existing material is available, and is used by us when we make, do, expect or avoid things. We do not invent ‘equipment’, it pre-exists us. It will have been made by others who were before us. This is also how we are connected to ‘others.’

A Dasein raised by wolves

A hypothetical example of a Dasein having been raised by wolves was discussed at some length. How would such a Dasein be able to tap into this pre-existing knowledge or material? Such a Dasein would not (say) recognise a table or a boat. Agreed. But, unlike the wolves who demonstrate clear limitations when compared to Daseins, Dasein has the capacity to be open to development (‘potential’). Dasein’s world is not ‘fixed.’

(From Simon Critchley’s blog: “…the human being is not just a being defined by being thrown into the world. It is also one who can throw off that thrown condition in a movement where it seizes hold of its possibilities, where it acts in a concrete situation. This movement is what Heidegger calls projection (Entwurf) and it is the very experience of what Heidegger will call, later in Being and Time, freedom. Freedom is not an abstract philosophical concept. It is the experience of the human being demonstrating its potential through acting in the world. To act in such a way is to be authentic.” See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jun/29/religion-philosophy)

Umwelt

Connected with this – and this point was revisited throughout the session - was the issue of the German word ‘Umwelt’ (environment) and animals. (We couldn’t seem to pin-point the location in the text where Heidegger speaks of these things) It is inevitable that when the human (in this case Dasein) and what it means to be human is discussed within philosophical contexts, the question of animals comes up. The subject raises important concerns which are wide-ranging. These issues include ‘the human’ and a variety of moral questions concerning boundaries and definitions of what is human, and where ‘human’ begins and ends. (E.g., the mentally disabled, the person in a coma, the unborn child.)

The question of ‘They’

Das Man in German – translates as ‘one’ in English. For example, ‘one must undertake something.’ English speakers tend nowadays to say ‘you’ in place of ‘one.’ (There are disadvantages to this.) Dasein is always connected to others. The ready-to-hand world of things (made by Daseins) contains the residue of others. There is even a sense that what is perceived to be the ‘natural’ world is not, of itself completely without the touch of Daseins. (The structure of the countryside – perceived to be ‘natural’ - is shaped by Daseins because of the various activities that take place there, for example)

The question of ‘self.’

It seems obvious that we have ‘selves’, that we are, each an ‘I’. However, our ‘selves’ are formed from outside. William Blattner explains: “…we do not experience ourselves as distinct from the world.”  And, “To be with others is not to be in their presence, but rather for what they are pursuing and how they lead their lives to make a difference to me.”  We are shaped by the community of others, a given social normativity, whatever that may entail, for good or ill. (See William Blattner, Heidegger’s Being and Time, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013) 65.) Identity is found within what we refer to as ‘society.’ Others and contexts.

The authentic self

Is Heidegger trying to have his cake and eat it here? This was another point to which we returned within the session. What does he mean by ‘authentic’? Is it the so called public front we present to the world (to others), or one we possess within the private sphere? Is this about the psychological personas we adopt, or not? If there isn’t really a ‘self’ how can there be authentic/inauthentic versions of a ‘self?’ The example was given again of the son who becomes a doctor because his parents are doctors.

The authentic/inauthentic question was not fully resolved in our discussion, but I am adding some further material here: The notion of the authentic or inauthentic self, returns us to ‘they.’ It is social normativity that shapes us. John Tietz says: Authentic existence is action based on awareness. Inauthentic existence is action characterised by unawares. He describes the ‘they’ or Das Man, as a “personification of the society, the authority of its beliefs over the life of the individual, but Dasein is always a part of this dictatorship.” (“What will they say if I do that?”) Reflects our interdependence, we are part of a ‘crowd’, or society. Depersonalized and “levelled down.” The “resultant averaging down of our beliefs” makes authenticity impossible “in a purely public context of inquiry.” “Authentic existence is an awareness of the possibilities of being-relations, and the awareness of the metaphysical significance of death. Inauthentic existence is grounded in preoccupation with actuality. It does not see the importance of possibility.” (See John Tietz, An Outline and Study Guide to Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (Frankfurt am Main, Humanities Online, 2001), 77-79.)

In recognising the unfinished nature of the authenticity point, Theodor Adorno’s “The Jargon of Authenticity” was recommended as a reference we might like to follow up. (See http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Jargon-Authenticity-Routledge-Classics/dp/0415289912)

Notes on Heidegger's Being and Time - 1.III: The worldhood of the world (pp. 91-148, §§ 14-24) - Wednesday, 28 October 2015

1.III: The worldhood of the world (pp. 91-148, §§ 14-24)

Wednesday, 28 October 2015 (Notes by Marton Ribary)

Zeug

In our everyday dealings (Umgang), things do not primordially present themselves as objects of formalised and abstract perception (Vorhandenheit/presence-at-hand). Rather, we encounter things as we go about our life and carry out the minutest projects (this is Merleau-Ponty’s term used in his Phenomenology of Perception) like opening a door by using the doorknob. In order to delineate things encountered in this way from things as object of formalised and abstract perception, Heidegger introduces the concept of Zeug (“equipment”/”useful thing”/”utensil” according to different English translations). Zeug is essentially “etwas um zu”, a thing with which we carry out a project (e.g. an instrument), or a thing which refers to something else (e.g. a sign). Zeug is encountered in the context of references. It opens up a network of interrelated entities which eventually constitute a totality, i.e. the “worldhood”, which is a key characteristic of Dasein’ existence.

Disengagement and the critique of modernity

Leif Jerram pointed out that Heidegger’s description of Zeug can be read in the context of the 19-20^th century critique of modernity. The industrial revolution and the standardised machine production of everyday goods resulted in a disengagement from the object we encounter in our daily life. We do not know anymore where, how and by whom the clothes we wear, the food we eat, the pencil we write with were created. Objects have lost their reference to the human side of production. The frozen pizza just shows up in our basket, the waste just disappears into the bins. We do not know anymore where they come from and where they go. Heidegger’s account of Zeug can be understood as an attempt to reconstruct the context of references which modernity pushed into oblivion, but still operates under our everyday dealings.

From Zeug to the mere Thing

The type of existence Zeug uncovers during our everyday dealings is what Heidegger calls readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit). This is the primary mode of existence of the entities, and it is only by privative modes that the presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) can be discovered. The avenue from readiness-to-hand of the Zeug to the presence-at-hand of a mere Things is marked by conspicuousness. When the Zeug is unusable (the doorknob does not open the door), missing (the doorknob is not on the door), standing in the way (the doorknob blocks the way to reach the keyhole) or used as a sign (the doorknob left on the kitchen table referring to the necessity of having it fixed), that is, when the Zeug fails a primary intention of a project, this is the moment when Zeug presents itself as an entity which has another type of existence, which points beyond the intended project. The Zeug has suddenly become a piece of useless metal and revealed an existence without the context of references. The Zeug has become a mere Thing, the conspicuousness has discovered its existence as presence-at-hand.

The critique of Descartes’ ontology

Heidegger’s criticism of Descartes is directed against his Thing-ontology which fails to acknowledge that the primary mode of encounter with entities is not the formalised and abstract perception of mere Things. Descartes’ description is correct, but only inasmuch as it is emphasised that it is not the primordial one – and that is where Descartes is wrong as he claims that the existence of mere Things is the primary mode of existence, and “values”, “intentions” etc. are attached to the entities only afterwards. According to Descartes, perception reveals the entities in their arithmetic purity, and the untrained human mind simply struggles to achieve perfect perception and muddies it with his/her own interests. According to Heidegger, it is the other way round. Entities are encountered within the involved dealings of Dasein. The complexity is the primary form of their existence, and there is a long way before we can extract the formalised and abstract perception from our primordial experience.

Ent-fernung/Ausrichtung

Towards the end of the section about the “worldhood of the world”, Heidegger discusses the mode by which the spatiality of Dasein can be grasped. After he has rejected Descartes’ division of entities into three groups, that is, mere things with only material substance (res extensa), God with only intellectual substance (res cogitnas), and the human being which is a combination of both, Heidegger needs to reinterpret Dasein’s spatiality which parts with Descartes’ idea of extensio. The concepts of Ent-fernung (de-severance/de-distancing) and Ausrichtung (directionality) try to capture the “active and transitive” (105) nature of perception which goes against the passive description of perception in Descartes. The encounter with entities is a perceptive-emotional-cognitive-etc. complex, these elements cannot be clearly delineated from each other in the first step. The complex everyday experience opens up a totality referring to the world shared by Dasein and the entities encountered during her/his dealings. This complex network of Dasein, entities and the world uncovers Dasein’s true spatiality. ”Both directionality and de-severance, as modes of Being-in-the-world, are guided beforehand by the circumspection of concern.” (108) “…that circumspective Being-in-the-world is spatial. … Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space.” (110-111).

Page numbers in these notes refer to those on the margin of Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) and its reprints. These page numbers on the margin correspond to the German original published by Max Niemeyer Verlag (Tübingen) and Band 2 of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe published by Vittorio Klostermann Verlag (Frankfurt). Being and Time is abbreviated as SZ in these notes.

Notes on Being and Time - 1.I-II: Preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein & Being-in-the-world (pp. 65-90, §§ 9-13) - Wednesday, 14 October 2015

1.I-II: Preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein & 

Being-in-the-world in general as the basic state of Dasein (pp. 65-90, §§ 9-13)

Wednesday, 14 October 2015 (Notes by Birsen Dönmez)

Key concepts for the hermeneutic of Dasein

Heidegger begins his ‘Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein’ (§9) by stating that we are in each case ourselves the ‘Being’(das Seiende  - “who does the being”) subject to analysis, the ‘being’ (das Sein) of which is in each case our own – “in each case myself” and “in each case mine” (Jemeinigkeit). Further key concepts are Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit (authenticity and inauthenticity), Alltäglichkeit ("everydayness"), Durchschnittlichkeit (“averageness”), Sorge (care), and Erkennen (knowing).

Vorhandensein and Dasein

Heidegger writes: »The essence of Dasein lies in its existence.« (67) (Das »Wesen« des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz. (42)) – thereby turning traditional ontology that concedes primacy to nature (essence) on its head. On that basis, he distinguishes Existenz (existence), denoting the mode of being of Dasein, from Vorhandensein (existential/“Being present-at-hand”) of a mere thing. The term Vorhandensein marks the clear distinction between Dasein and a thing. Whereas Dasein is characterised by various possible modes of being that can never be said to indicate properties ready to be classified. Consequently, Heidegger introduces the term Existenzialien (“existentialia”) referring to modes of Being as to be distinguished from classical ontological categories (see Aristotle and Kant). One of Dasein’s existentiale is the »In-der-Welt-sein« (‘Being-in-the world’). In light of Heidegger’s rejection of an application of these hierarchical categories to Dasein, it stands out that he denies any such judgement of value to the modes of Being (Existenzialien), i.e. in considering both authenticity and inauthenticity, as equally revelatory access points to the hermeneutic of Dasein. Heidegger's refusal to differentiate the modes of Being from the outset of his project lends a preliminary method to his inquiry: it is Dasein’s uncharacteristic everydayness that gives clues in their "averageness" (des Daseins Durchschnittlichkeit) to Dasein’s "positive phenomenal characteristics of Being". It is interesting that, for Heidegger, knowledge also denotes no more than such a mode of being - no doubt we will get to find out more about this in course of our reading.

»In-der-Welt-sein« as Cartesian critique

With Descartes the relationship between the human and the external world became central to Western philosophy. But whereas traditional epistemology proceeded from the philosopher as a detached observer of objects in the world Heidegger shifts the focus in SZ to active engagement as characteristic of human existence in the world - a world participated in and inhabited by Dasein - 'Being-there' as the human way of existence as being implicated in the world, or 'Being-in-the-world'. Sorge (care), is a term Heidegger introduces to further elucidate the relationship of Dasein with the world and does here not refer to anxiety or worry, which would also be meanings of Sorge in German. Its task is to give a point of access to a further analysis of the 'in' in 'Being-in-the-world'.

Page numbers in these notes refer to those on the margin of Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) and its reprints. These page numbers on the margin correspond to the German original published by Max Niemeyer Verlag (Tübingen) and Band 2 of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe published by Vittorio Klostermann Verlag (Frankfurt). Being and Time is abbreviated as SZ in these notes.

Notes on Being and Time - Introduction (pp. 19-64; §§ 1-8) - Wednesday, 30 September 2015

Page numbers in these notes refer to those on the margin of Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) and its reprints. These page numbers on the margin correspond to the German original published by Max Niemeyer Verlag (Tübingen) and Band 2 of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe published by Vittorio Klostermann Verlag (Frankfurt).

Being and Time is abbreviated as SZ in these notes.

Introduction (pp. 19-64; §§ 1-8)

Wednesday, 30 September 2015 (notes by Marton Ribary)

The language of SZ

Heidegger creates an idiosyncratic language in SZ which deliberately deviates from the standard philosophical vocabulary. Loaded nominal constructions, neologisms and etymologically sensitive reinterpretations of everyday words create a German which is hardly recognisable for the native speaker, and poses an almost insurmountable challenge for the translators. Philosophy, which is understood by Heidegger as “universal phenomenological ontology” starting with “the hermeneutic of Dasein” (38), “lack[s] not only most of the words but, above all, the ‘grammar’”. (39)

Members of our group read SZ in the German original as well as in English, Italian, Spanish, Polish and Hungarian. The translations sometimes make Heidegger’s German even more obscure by covering etymological references, or by reintroducing traditional philosophical language which Heidegger wanted to avoid. For the former, an example is the Italian ‘l’essere’ which fails to mirror the grammatical form (verbal noun) and the added meaning of “presence” encoded in the German “Dasein”. For the latter, an example is the English “entity” which reintroduces a scholastic term as the translation of the present participle “das Seiende” which literally means “that which is”. Macquarrie and Robinson draw attention to this choice of word in their very first footnote of the book (3). Readers of SZ in any language need to remain alert to terminological problems, something which our multilingual reading group promises to highligh during the year.

Dasein

Our discussion departed from the concept of Dasein which is left untranslated in Macquarrie-Robinson, while other translations struggled to reproduce it in any meaningful way. For example, the Hungarian term “jelenvalólét” is an almost nonsensical neologism which literally means “the being which is present”.

In Heidegger’s definition, “this entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term ‘Dasein’” – “Dieses Seiende, das wir selbst je sind und das unter anderem die Seinsmöglichkeit das Fragens hat, fassen wir terminologisch als Dasein.” (7) The Dasein only happens to be the human being, because we, who embark on the inquiry targeting the meaning of Being, happen to be humans. Potentially, Dasein could denote God, a Martian or any other entity (Seiende) which reflects on its own possibilities of Being (Seinsmöglichkeit). However, the phenomenological method which Heidegger employs allow no other entry to the inquiry than through the entities who are the inquirers themselves. It is only because of the human perspective of the inquirer that Dasein effectively denotes the human existence in SZ, but this is purely accidental.

The deconstruction of the philosophical tradition

Heidegger criticises the philosophical tradition which has eliminated Dasein, the entity reflecting on its own Being. Heidegger notes this line of inquiry in the fragments of Parmenides, but he notices that they start to sink into oblivion already in Plato. The metaphysical framework of Aristotle (Categories) which offered a solid description of “things” has dominated philosophy and the sciences, and the supposed metaphysical innovations of Descartes and Kant did not manage to break away from the perspective of “things”. The “what … which pertains to a subject-matter” (eines sachhaltigen Was) (12) cannot be applied to an entity the Being of which surpasses the “what-like” Being of mere things. The metaphysical tradition, according to Heidegger, needs a radical turn: an existential metaphysics from the perspective of Dasein needs to be developed which will be able to encompass the more restricted perspective of the metaphysics of things. (Please note that this is MR’s interpretation of the SZ’s main objective.)

Things and Dasein – ontic and ontological

Dasein is distinguished among the entities by the very fact that it reflects on its own Being, that “in its very Being, that Being is an issue”. (12) The non-reflective “things” and the reflective Dasein are both entities (τὰ ὂντα - ta onta), but the peculiar reflective position grants Dasein an ontic priority. On the one hand, the log of wood cannot reflect on its own Being, neither understands itself in terms of remaining a log of wood, or becoming a table. On the other hand, Dasein cannot avoid making its own Being an “issue” for itself, because either by choosing to become something other than it currently is, or by neglecting to make any decision, it acts towards its own Being one way or another. Heidegger’s positions seems to be a radical reformulation of Aristotle’s metaphysical distinction of potentiality and actuality from the perspective of Dasein (MR). In Aristotle, the entity which is a log of wood in actual terms is potentially a table – that potentiality is part of that particular entity’s metaphysical profile. Similarly, in Heidegger, the Dasein holds an actual and potential Being with one crucial difference, namely that unlike the log of wood, Dasein reflects upon and acts towards its potential forms of Being. “Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself.” (12) The ontical inquiry is concerned about the metaphysical structure of entities (τὰ ὂντα - ta onta), the ontological inquiry asks the more primordial question of what it means to be.

Heidegger's Being and Time - Reading schedule for 2015-2016

Wednesday 5pm, fortnightly

Samuel Alexander building, A104

First session:

The Introduction of Being and Time (pp. 19-64 (§§ 1-8))

Wednesday, 30 September 2015

After Merleau-Ponty and Hegel in the last two years, the Manchester Phenomenology Reading Group dedicates the 2015-2016 academic year to Martin Heidegger's Being and Time.

As in previous years, our aim is to read through a massive volume of phenomenology's classics which are often referred to, but rarely actually read in their entirety. The reading group meets fortnightly, six times in each terms, and therefore the selected book is divided into 12 portions. Our meetings offer an informal and friendly forum to discuss our reading experience, and eventually get a better understanding of what always is complex, nerve-wrecking and thought-provoking.

Our reference English translation of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (SZ) is the following:

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962)

There are many reprints of the above translation, most recently by HarperCollins. All reprints, new and used, keep the layout and pagination of the first 1962 edition.

The reference German original is published by Max Niemeyer Verlag (Tübingen) which corresponds to Band 2 of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe published by Vittorio Klostermann Verlag (Frankfurt). Please note that the Macquarrie-Robinson translation includes page numbers on the margin which refer to the above German originals.

A careful study of the table of contents of the SZ suggested that shorter sections are denser in philosophical terms and longer ones are slightly easier to digest. Therefore, the suggested reading schedule keeps sections together and creates some shorter and some longer reading portions, especially during the Autumn term.

Page numbers in the reading schedule below refer to the Macquarrie-Robinson translation. I have also included chapter numbers which appear both in the German original and the English translation.

Autumn term 2015

30 September: pp. 19-64 (§§ 1-8)

14 October: pp. 65-90 (§§ 9-13)

28 October: pp. 91-148 (§§ 14-24)

11 November: pp. 149-168 (§§ 25-27)

25 November: pp. 169-224 (§§ 28-38)

9 December: pp. 225-273 (§§ 39-44)

Spring term 2016

3 February: pp. 274-311 (§§ 45-53)

17 February: pp. 312-348 (§§ 54-60)

2 March: pp. 349-382 (§§ 61-66)

16 March: pp. 383-423 (§§ 67-71)

13 April: pp. 424-455 (§§ 72-77)

27 April: pp. 456-488 (§§ 78-83)

The first portion is probably the most demanding, partly for the reason that this is where Heidegger introduces his method and the idiosyncratic vocabulary which dominates the SZ. Please do not let yourself be intimidated.

Please send me an e-mail (marton.ribary@gmail.com), if possible, if you are planning to join the reading group, and encourage your friends and colleagues to join us. The reading group is open to all.

Notes of the 6 May session

C. (CC.) Religion: VII. Religion: A. Natural religion & B. Religion in the form of art (410-453)

Wednesday, 6 May 2015 (notes by Marton Ribary)

The link between religion and art:

Hegel links the first two shapes of religion, that is, natural religion and religion in the form of art by the person who performs the deed uniting form and matter. The artificer (Werkmeister) is a superhuman person who performs the embodiment of the idea and creates the tangible world in the shape of natural religion. Hegel’s description and terminology fits the demiurge of Greek (and later Gnostic) thought where the demiurge is not the ultimate Godhead, but simply the performer of creation.

The same creative power is accredited to the artist. In the shape of the religion of art, the demiurge’s creative power has become self-conscious in the person of the artist. The power to unite the two equal manifestations of the Spirit, namely matter and from, are no longer external, but possessed by the Spirit who becomes self-conscious in the person of the artist.

The self-discovery of the artist:

As Hegel describes in §§708-710, the Spirit gradually discovers itself in the person of the artist, it eventually becomes self-conscious. (1) The anonymous creator of the artwork is yet to realise the relevance of the creative deed which has united the two equal manifestations of the Spirit, that is, the matter and the form. (2) By the admiration the artwork attracts from an audience, the artist realises that s/he has created an embodied idea which has independent existence. Thereby the Spirit recognises itself in the artwork and becomes self-conscious of its own creative power. The artwork is an external manifestation of the Spirit which has yet to return to the person of the artist so that the self-consciousness of the Spirit become individual and immediately present. (3) According to Hegel, the return of the Spirit to itself (from the artwork to the person of the artist) is realised by language which enables a higher form of self-consciousness in which the creative power of the Spirit is immediately accessible to itself and retained in its own person.

The temporal shapes of religion:

In our usual fashion, we made our way backwards in Hegel’s exposition. In §683, Hegel describes three temporal shapes of religion which are distinguished from each other according to the Spirit’s journey of self-discovery. (1) In natural religion, “Spirit knows itself as its object in a natural or immediate shape”, and therefore “Spirit in general is in the form of consciousness”. (2) In the religion of art, “Spirit knows itself in the shape of a superseded natural existence”, and therefore Spirit in general is in the form “of self-consciousness”. (3) In revealed religion, Spirit overcomes the one-sidedness of the previous two shapes, and realises the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness. “The self is just as much an immediacy, as the immediacy is the self.”

Beyond the shapes of religion:

However, Hegel adds that even though “Spirit has indeed attained its true shape” in revealed religion, the shape and the accompanying picture-thought (Vorstellung) are yet to be superseded so that Spirit may reach the Notion (Begriff) “which equally embraces its own opposite”. (§683) The final stage of the Spirit’s journey which is beyond the shapes of religion, and beyond any shapes for that matter, is presumably what Hegel calls “Absolute Knowing” in the concluding part of the Phenomenology.

The definition of religion:

Hegel’s understanding of religion is different from the common use of the word. Religion is defined as “the perfection of Spirit into which its individual moments – consciousness, self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit – return … The genesis of religion in general is contained in the movement of the universal moments.” (§680) Contrary to science which maintains a sharp division between the observing “I” and the observed “object”, religion supersedes the division and allows the Spirit’s self-discovery.

Notes of the 22 April 2015 session

C. (BB.) Spirit: VI. Spirit: C. Spirit that is certain of itself. Morality (364-409)

Wednesday, 22 April 2015 (notes by Marton Ribary)

Only the movement is real:

Hegel’s dialectical method has demonstrated that whatever is treated as stable will necessarily destabilise itself by having been contrasted with its opposite. The dialectical movement of reflection allows no room for the so-called “eternal truth” that philosophy has been chasing for too long. Inasmuch as thought is treated as a single, solid and stable piece of knowledge, it becomes immediately fragile to challenges. Only the movement is real, and therefore only the constant progress from one form to another can hold the claim to be true.

The reality of thoughts:

Consequently, contrary to the long-standing philosophical dogma, inasmuch as a thought is true, it must be real, inasmuch it is real, it must be moving and alive. They are not the eternal Platonic entities that mortal humans occasionally take part of when they have reached an advanced level of philosophical reflection. The age old contradistinction between mortal humans and immortal thoughts is a mistake – mortals do not borrow immortal ideas when they think. What I think here and now is not the same what Plato thought 2400 years ago. In short, there is no such thing as philosophia perennis (and thereby a good part of contemporary analytic philosophy is following a dead-end.) Just as humans are born, live and die, thoughts are living entities too.

The empty nature of morality:

In the previous section, Hegel has demonstrated with strong allusions to the French Revolution that absolute freedom is empty and eventually devours itself. He moves on to discuss whether morality can be used as a reference point for our conduct, and concludes that all externally set rules are empty and meaningless. Set rules destabilise themselves because what is treated as solid and unchanged falls victim to dialectical reflection. Moral standards set by another consciousness (God, society, the perfect law-giver, Kant’s formal rules etc.) turn out to be empty and meaningless, because they are dead and do not move forward, and because they are outside the consciousness (the “I”) who is supposed to follow them.

The acting conscience:

Internalised, dynamic and self-constituted standards seem to be the solution for the problem of human conduct. In what Hegel calls “duty”, conscience serves as the force of human action. Just as set standards turn into their opposite by dialectical reflection, abstaining from action and thereby creating a moral zero is similarly static and self-destroying. The “beautiful soul’s” solution to the moral conundrum of action eventually leads nowhere. By overcoming the self-destroying character of static standards of conduct, acting conscience (that is, duty) is capable of moving towards self-realisation without turning into its opposite and eliminating itself in the process. The key is that self-realisation is not achieved by reaching a set target or by living a perfectly moral life, but by being recognised by another consciousness. The acting conscience realises itself by being recognised by another.

Revised reading schedule

Centre for Jewish Studies office
Samuel Alexander Building
West Wing, Lower Ground Floor, Room 11

Wednesday 5pm

Below please find a revised schedule for reading the remaining parts of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in the Spring term of the 2014-2015 academic year (7 sessions). Page numbers refer to the following edition: G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) and its reprints.

Spring 2015:

25 February, 5pm:

pp. 236-294.

11 March, 5pm:

pp. 294-355.

18 March, 5pm:

pp. 1-45.

22 April, 5pm:

pp. 355-409.

6 May, 5pm:

pp. 410-453.

13 May, 5pm:

pp. 453-494.