1.IV: The “They” (pp. 149-168, §§ 25-27)
Wednesday, 11 November 2015
(Notes by Caroline Kaye)
The question of ‘in’
“Thus Dasein’s world frees
entities which not only are quite distinct from equipment and Things, but which
also – in accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein themselves – are ‘in’
the world in which they are at the same time encountered within-the-world, and
are ‘in’ it by way of Being-in –the-world.” (118-9)
There is a tendency to regard the
‘in’ here as appertaining to ‘inside’ as in a container. This is not what
Heidegger is driving at. One is not ‘in’ the world as if the world were a type
of jam jar into which we are placed. We should think more about the kind of
‘in’ when used to describe (say) being ‘in’ love, or being ‘in’ doubt. (Not a
car in a garage) World, and being in the world, or ‘in’ world should be seen as
dynamic. Not static. Not objective. Lived existence, as activity, not
necessarily in the physical sense. Not ‘in’ as ‘inside’ in a literal, physical
sense.
‘Stitched into’ the world
We also discussed the sense of
being ‘stitched into’ the world, or our existence. ‘Knowing’ things is not in
any way ‘starting from scratch.’ We recognise the contextualised nature of
knowledge. Life is something that is already happening when we enter it. It’s
not something we can ‘stop’ and step outside from. There is no ‘pause’ button
to press that would allow us to take an objective look at the world, or aspects
of it. We are never outside World.
Conventions in the world precede
our own existence. This pre-existing material is available, and is used by us
when we make, do, expect or avoid things. We do not invent ‘equipment’, it
pre-exists us. It will have been made by others who were before us. This is
also how we are connected to ‘others.’
A Dasein raised by wolves
A hypothetical example of a Dasein
having been raised by wolves was discussed at some length. How would such a
Dasein be able to tap into this pre-existing knowledge or material? Such a
Dasein would not (say) recognise a table or a boat. Agreed. But, unlike the
wolves who demonstrate clear limitations when compared to Daseins, Dasein has
the capacity to be open to development (‘potential’). Dasein’s world is not
‘fixed.’
(From Simon Critchley’s blog:
“…the human being is not just a being defined by being thrown into the world.
It is also one who can throw off that thrown condition in a movement where it
seizes hold of its possibilities, where it acts in a concrete situation. This
movement is what Heidegger calls projection (Entwurf) and it is the very
experience of what Heidegger will call, later in Being and Time, freedom.
Freedom is not an abstract philosophical concept. It is the experience of the
human being demonstrating its potential through acting in the world. To act in
such a way is to be authentic.” See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jun/29/religion-philosophy)
Umwelt
Connected with this – and this
point was revisited throughout the session - was the issue of the German word
‘Umwelt’ (environment) and animals. (We couldn’t seem to pin-point the location
in the text where Heidegger speaks of these things) It is inevitable that when
the human (in this case Dasein) and what it means to be human is discussed
within philosophical contexts, the question of animals comes up. The subject
raises important concerns which are wide-ranging. These issues include ‘the
human’ and a variety of moral questions concerning boundaries and definitions
of what is human, and where ‘human’ begins and ends. (E.g., the mentally
disabled, the person in a coma, the unborn child.)
The question of ‘They’
Das Man in German – translates as
‘one’ in English. For example, ‘one must undertake something.’ English speakers
tend nowadays to say ‘you’ in place of ‘one.’ (There are disadvantages to this.)
Dasein is always connected to others. The ready-to-hand world of things (made
by Daseins) contains the residue of others. There is even a sense that what is
perceived to be the ‘natural’ world is not, of itself completely without the
touch of Daseins. (The structure of the countryside – perceived to be ‘natural’
- is shaped by Daseins because of the various activities that take place there,
for example)
The question of ‘self.’
It seems obvious that we have
‘selves’, that we are, each an ‘I’. However, our ‘selves’ are formed from
outside. William Blattner explains: “…we do not experience ourselves as
distinct from the world.” And, “To be
with others is not to be in their presence, but rather for what they are pursuing
and how they lead their lives to make a difference to me.” We are shaped by the community of others, a
given social normativity, whatever that may entail, for good or ill. (See William
Blattner, Heidegger’s Being and Time,
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013) 65.) Identity is found within what we refer to as
‘society.’ Others and contexts.
The authentic self
Is Heidegger trying to have his
cake and eat it here? This was another point to which we returned within the
session. What does he mean by ‘authentic’? Is it the so called public front we
present to the world (to others), or one we possess within the private sphere?
Is this about the psychological personas we adopt, or not? If there isn’t
really a ‘self’ how can there be authentic/inauthentic versions of a ‘self?’ The
example was given again of the son who becomes a doctor because his parents are
doctors.
The authentic/inauthentic question
was not fully resolved in our discussion, but I am adding some further material
here: The notion of the authentic or inauthentic self, returns us to ‘they.’ It
is social normativity that shapes us. John Tietz says: Authentic existence is
action based on awareness. Inauthentic existence is action characterised by
unawares. He describes the ‘they’ or Das Man, as a “personification of the
society, the authority of its beliefs over the life of the individual, but Dasein
is always a part of this dictatorship.” (“What will they say if I do that?”)
Reflects our interdependence, we are part of a ‘crowd’, or society.
Depersonalized and “levelled down.” The “resultant averaging down of our
beliefs” makes authenticity impossible “in a purely public context of inquiry.”
“Authentic existence is an awareness of the possibilities of being-relations,
and the awareness of the metaphysical significance of death. Inauthentic
existence is grounded in preoccupation with actuality. It does not see the
importance of possibility.” (See John Tietz, An Outline and Study Guide to Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (Frankfurt
am Main, Humanities Online, 2001), 77-79.)
In recognising the unfinished
nature of the authenticity point, Theodor Adorno’s “The Jargon of Authenticity”
was recommended as a reference we might like to follow up. (See http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Jargon-Authenticity-Routledge-Classics/dp/0415289912)
