2.I: Dasein’s possibility of
Being-a-whole, and Being-towards-death (pp. 274-311, §§ 45-53)
Wednesday, 3 February 2016
(Notes by Caroline Kaye)
Death as a consolidating
concept
Placed at a strategic point of
transition between the two parts of the book, between “Being” and “Time”, the
section about death seems to consolidate many topics raised in the first half
while preparing the way for other topics to be discussed in the second.
Notwithstanding the neologisms, it is helpful to think about Dasein (thus far –
what Dasein *is*) in terms of what Dasein *is not*, or its negation. A connection
was made with Hegel here. The chapter signals a step into a new phase of
thinking which still stresses the “ownmost” aspect of existence. Death is
Dasein’s “ownmost” experience.
To whom does death belong?
One way to consider death (with
being) was to consider that death belongs to those who take care of your body
after physical death. There is a kind of existence (being) that carries on, but
you cannot experience it as yourself. (The “deceased”) Death is something that you
are aware of, but this does not extend to knowing, experiencing, *being* in
death. Dasein ceases to reflect in a contemplative way when Dasein ceases to
be, ceases being even.
Dying and Death
How can you not “own” something
that is yours? The two experiences of birth and death are events that are
Dasein’s ownmost, and yet they are not really experienced in the normal way.
Everydayness lies between birth and death. No-one else can “die” on your
behalf, it’s yours and yours alone, yet you still cannot experience death.
“Inauthentic being-towards-death
turns away from it by merely awaiting it as a ‘someday’ eventuality. Only
facing death as what it is – our ownmost, non-relational impending and not to be
outstripped – is authentic”. (Steven Foulds, A Serious Guide to Being and Time)
Dasein is always my own, to
reflect upon. But the reflection on cessation to exist is not what Heidegger
means. He doesn’t mean our dread of dying per se, nor knowledge of the
biological fact of dying. Although that
may be something a person experiences, this is not what Heidegger refers to.
“If we don’t understand our own
deaths [our finitude] then we don’t understand our existence [our there-being]
as persons – we lack truth, we lack certainty, and we lack conviction”. (Foulds)
It is not that we cannot reflect
upon our own deaths, but that at the moment of death, the Dasein “project” is
completed and reflection is no longer possible. My death is my ownmost because
it defines (delimits) my life which gives it meaning.
The certainty of Death
Death is inevitable in an
inductive-biological sense, but the highest level of certainty can never be achieved.
The certainty of death is not the certainty of “1+1=2”, it is not an apodictic
certainty. It is simply concluded by way of induction that because all people
before has died, I will die myself. Since Hulme, such inductive certainty is
clearly differentiated from apodictic certainty. The ‘they’ creates many
methods of concealing the inevitability of death, as Foulds put it: “Death is
sanitised with euphemisms, the ‘they’ provides tranquillisation about death.”
Death and authenticity
There was a discussion on the role
of the supernatural, the infinite, God in Heidegger who had a strong theological
background. The point was made that the notion of an afterlife emanates from a
strong Christian tradition which was very dominant at the time of Heidegger’s
writing (of Being and Time). We should not fall back on the notion that “if I
have five years to live, I can change my life accordingly…” This is not what
Heidegger means. The very idea that there is a limitation is transformative. It
is the ultimate possibility, or more precisely, the very fact that makes all
things count by marking Dasein’s existence as finite. For this reason, death
plays a role in the creation of an authentic life.
Dasein as Being-towards-death.
Death provides Dasein with an
end-point and thereby allows its existence to run a full circle and become whole.
Only because Dasein is finite that its possibilities exist, otherwise whatever Dasein
does would remain incidental which could be picked up or dismissed at any point
during an endless existence. Only because Dasein is finite that its existence
and activities matter which manifests itself in everyday life as care. The
end-point of Dasein’s existence provides meaning to its existence. It is on a
trajectory which points towards the end-point. Dasein is a “project” moving through
time.
Death - why now?
Why didn’t Heidegger start his
book with “death” or introduce the idea earlier? Having got to this part of the
book, it seems now like this could have been an obvious choice on his part. Was
the topic of death it deliberately avoided? Or is it an afterthought? We
returned to the then prevailing discourse that Heidegger is eager to challenge.
The concept of death in the first part of the book is, in a sense is “present
by its absence”. (You might wonder why it isn’t mentioned as you read)
Heidegger seems keen to challenge the overwhelming Christian world view that places
much emphasis on a promise of life after death. In many ways, the puzzles
raised by this particular chapter may not be resolved until later on in the
book.
